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A Journal of the Yale Law School

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Latest Post on Notice & Comment

D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: No Net Neutrality … and the Dangers of “Moreover,” by Aaron Nielson
JREG Notice and Comment - Saturday, May 28, 2016

Everyone, it seems, is waiting for the D.C. Circuit’s “net neutrality” decision. The case was argued last December and so could be decided anytime.* But it wasn’t decided this week. Although the D.C. Circuit’s only opinion this week did involve the FCC, and while it was authored by Judge Tatel, it wasn’t the big one that is destined to rob a lot of D.C. lawyers of their weekends.   Read more...

Duke Law Journal AdLaw Symposium: Is Intellectual Property Law Administrative Law? (AdLaw Bridge Series), by Chris Walker
Chris Walker - Friday, May 27, 2016

As I blogged about back in February, Duke Law Journal's annual administrative law symposium this year is titled Intellectual Property Exceptionalism in Administrative Law. Video of February's live symposium is available here. It was a terrific event, and draft papers were very thought provoking.   Read more...

Response to Kagan on Torres v. Lynch and Immigration Exceptionalism, by Patrick Glen
Chris Walker - Friday, May 27, 2016

Last June, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mellouli v. Lynch, I wrote a brief post  responding to Chris Walker’s commentary on the Chevron deference quirk of that case. Although ostensibly concluding that the “controlled substance” ground of deportability was ambiguous and that a reasonable agency interpretation of the statute would be entitled to deference, a majority of the Court held that the Board’s interpretation made “scant sense” and imposed its own limiting construction on the statute. One of Walker’s posited explanations for this strange “application” of deference seemed most compelling to me: “The bizarreness of Chevron ’s invocation in [Mellouli] is more likely attributable to the substantive area of law—immigration—and the soft-stepping of basic administrative law principles that both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals engage in when the threat of deportation looms.” As I concluded, “[w]here deportation is concerned [] the Supreme Court’s conception of room for deference to the agency’s interpretation of the removability provisions is more circumscribed than it otherwise would be in other administrative law contexts, or even in other areas of immigration law concerning relief from removal or the conferral of benefits.”   Read more...


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