Notice & Comment

The Muddy Waters of BAAJA

Introduced in September by Senators Capito, Lee, Whitehouse, and Heinrich, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026 (BAAJA) has been the subject of much scholarly analysis and critique. Previous analyses primarily focus on the ways in which BAAJA would amend the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act and undermine Tribal sovereignty. BAAJA merits scrutiny on both counts.

That said, its inclusion of §1204(a), an ambiguous amendment to the Clean Water Act’s longstanding 404(c) “veto” process, has largely gone unexamined thus far. A procedural vote on the bill is expected in the Senate on November 9, 2026. Surfacing ambiguity pre-enactment is prudent given the Supreme Court’s admonition in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo that, “in the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.”

This comment begins with a background on Clean Water Act (CWA) §404(c), examines the ambiguity of BAAJA’s §1204(a) amendment, and closes with recommendations to clarify intent.

CWA §404(c)

Enacted in 1972, §404(c) is referred to as an EPA veto. In short, the CWA establishes a cooperative federalism framework where the EPA administers the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program under §402, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) primarily administers the dredge-and-fill program under §404. Congress included §404(c) to provide a method by which EPA could assert concerns and even halt the disposal of fill material in a particular location when it determines that such a disposal would have unacceptable adverse impacts on fish, wildlife, drinking water, or recreational uses of waters. Notably, EPA has used §404(c) only fourteen times in fifty-four years. USACE approves approximately 60,000-75,000 activities each year pursuant to its §404 authority. Accordingly, §404(c) determinations are rare. When EPA has issued a §404(c) determination, it has often done so because of unacceptable adverse impacts to fish and wildlife on behalf of state or federal fish and wildlife agencies.

Having worked at the White House Council on Environmental Quality from February 2021 through January 2025, I can attest that §404(c) is rarely used because it is such a strong tool. The EPA, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service seek to conserve natural resources per their respective statutory missions. The USACE, on the other hand, often struggles to justify project cost increases beyond the minimum required to avoid “unacceptable adverse impacts.” Accordingly, §404(c) brings these agencies together to find a compromise project design that can reduce adverse impacts to within an “acceptable” threshold.

In other words, the missions of each agency require them to maximize for different outcomes. For USACE: fulfillment of project purpose and a justified benefit-cost ratio; for EPA: protection of human health and the environment. By allowing EPA to prohibit an action USACE may otherwise authorize only when a certain significant threshold of unacceptable adverse impacts would result, the CWA requires the agencies to pursue an interagency consensus. Though EPA’s broad authority under §404(c) has been upheld in the courts, its use remains subject to legal challenge. As evidenced by its sparing application, the vast majority of permits are wholly unaffected by §404(c).

BAAJA §1204(a)

Despite the irrelevance of §404(c) to most of the 60,000-75,000 activities USACE authorizes each year, BAAJA would fundamentally upend its premise. §1204(a) would amend §404(c) as follows (deleted text shown with strikethrough; added text shown in italics):

(c) (c) SPECIFICATION OR USE OF DEFINED AREA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.— The Administrator The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make public his findings and his reasons for making any determination under this subsection.

(2) PERIOD OF PROHIBITION.— The period during which the Administrator may prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, or deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, under paragraph (1)—

(A) begins on the date on which an applicant submits a complete application under this section; and

(B) ends on the date on which the Secretary issues the permit.

Relevance aside, §1204(a) is ambiguous. Commentators thus far adopt one reading: that this provision cabins the time during which the EPA Administrator may make a §404(c) determination. In this interpretation, EPA could issue a §404(c) determination only after a complete application has been submitted to USACE and before the date on which USACE issues a permit.

Out of fourteen §404(c) determinations, only two have been the result of agency action outside of this window. In 2014, EPA began the process to prohibit specification of a disposal site in Alaska’s Bristol Bay watershed before the Pebble Limited Partnership had completed its application. In 2011, EPA issued a §404(c) Final Determination (subsequently upheld by the D.C. Circuit) for the Spruce No. 1 Surface Mine in Logan County, West Virginia, four years after USACE issued a permit. While it is possible that the Senate sponsors intend only to prohibit preemptive and retroactive 404(c) actions like those at the Pebble and Spruce mines, that is not the only reading of §1204(a).

A second interpretation, advanced by this comment, is that §1204(a) means what it says: it circumscribes the period of prohibition. In other words, the period during which the Administrator may prohibit and during which the prohibition is in place are both circumscribed by §1204(a)’s addition of a new subsection §404(c)(2). The EPA Administrator, under this provision, can “prohibit the specification of” or “deny or restrict the use of any defined area” for discharge of fill only between the submission of a completed application and the issuance of a §404 permit by USACE.

The first interpretation has normatively problematic policy implications. The duration of a §404 permit can range from three to ten years. If ecological considerations change such that impacts which at issuance were acceptable become unacceptable, under BAAJA, EPA would be unable to retroactively prohibit or revise the permit. If the Administrator may make such a determination only between application and issuance of a permit, EPA might issue a §404(c) determination before engaging directly with USACE in order to preserve its veto in advance of permit issuance. For many permits, it would be impracticable to meet existing §404(c) requirement of notice and an opportunity for public hearings prior to issuance of such a determination. Some general permits require no application at all; others require only pre-construction notification. Even individual permits can be processed within a year. Accordingly, EPA may not have the time to meet process requirements, rendering §404(c) nonfunctional.

The second interpretation eviscerates §404(c). If EPA’s prohibition must be made after a complete permit application has been submitted, and the attendant denial or restriction of the use of the defined area lasts only until USACE issues a permit, USACE will have no need to seriously engage the EPA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, or state fish and wildlife agencies to mitigate unacceptable adverse impacts. Indeed, a 404(c) determination would have no actual effect whatsoever for new permit applications. It is already the case that an applicant cannot dispose fill without a §404 permit, and a new applicant would not yet have one.

Clearing Muddy Waters

If the legislature is seeking to restrict pre-emptive and retroactive 404(c) determinations like those used to halt the Spruce and Pebble Mines, the relevant text should say so. For example:

(2) RESTRICTION ON PRE-APPLICATION AND POST-PERMIT DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTRATOR. — The Administrator may issue a determination made pursuant to paragraph (1) only within the period that—

(A) begins on the date on which an applicant submits a complete application under this section; and

(B) ends on the date on which the Secretary issues the permit.

If the legislature is seeking to expedite the processing of §404 permit applications, it should instead amend §404(q). This section requires USACE and EPA to develop interagency agreements regarding the timely processing of applications. If after considering the existing memorandum between USACE and EPA, Congress finds it lacking, it could amend BAAJA to instead be more prescriptive regarding what constitutes unacceptable delay.

If the legislature is seeking to limit the period during which both the determination must be made and during which it prohibits discharge of fill in the specified area subject to the determination, then the bill is intended to functionally delete §404(c) in its entirety and should be transparent about its aims. While §404(c) has had an infinitesimally small effect on infrastructure projects nationwide for fifty-four years, if the Congress intends to repeal it, the text should be clear and obvious. The price of certainty for developers cannot be ambiguity for the agencies or the public. Perhaps in the business of statutory drafting, if it is not transparent, it shouldn’t be acceptable.

Sara Gonzalez-Rothi is a Visiting Associate Professor at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. Her scholarship examines the separation of powers and what Article I requires of Congress.