Today’s Ad Law Reading Room entry is “Appropriations Presidentialism,” by Matthew B. Lawrence, Eloise Pasachoff, and Zachary S. Price, which is forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal Online. Here is the abstract:

The executive branch is attempting to change how federal spending works by asserting unilateral authority to condition, delay, cancel, or otherwise disrupt federal obligations and expenditures without regard to longstanding legal understandings and norms. Because this appropriations presidentialism is unprecedented in its scope and degree, it threatens to marginalize Congress while disrupting the settled expectations of civil servants, contractors, grantees, spending program beneficiaries, and others who were counting on continued federal spending for certain programs or activities. Those injured by these executive actions are understandably turning to courts for redress. But while courts have an important role to play in maintaining checks and balances, excessive judicial oversight of federal spending risks further shifting control away from Congress and exacerbating the potential for disruption.

This Essay documents this new appropriations presidentialism and offers preliminary reflections on appropriate responses. It urges courts addressing spending disputes to proceed with caution and due attention to the complex tradeoffs that attend judicial intervention in this area. In addition, it urges courts to attend carefully to the specifics of the appropriations and authorizing laws that govern specific programs and activities, even in the face of sweeping executive claims of blanket authority. And finally, it stresses that there is ultimately no substitute for Senators’ and Representatives’ energy and attention when it comes to maintaining Congress’s constitutional authority over the public purse.

In conversations I’ve had with other professors about how to alter the administrative law syllabus in light of Trump 2.0, one point that’s consistently come up is the importance of appropriations and spending. Historically, giving proper attention to such issues has been made difficult by the administrative law course’s traditional focus on judicial review and the fact that, as the authors of “Appropriations Presidentialism” point out, matters involving appropriations have until recently mostly been worked out in extrajudicial settings.

Well, things are changing. This essay—by an intimidating troika of experts—documents the rise of appropriations presidentialism, which has culminated in the second Trump administration using a variety of tools in an attempt to assert unilateral control over spending decisions. In addition to its practical effect on those who receive federal funds, appropriations presidentialism also promises (or threatens) to bring courts into the appropriations mix in a much more thoroughgoing way. The possible result, as the authors describe, is a fundamental reshuffling of the separation of powers when it comes to appropriations. “Appropriations Presidentialism”—which clocks in at an eminently readable 25 pages—is both a short and engaging introduction to the issues and an extremely thoughtful preliminary assessment of an important development.

The Ad Law Reading Room is a recurring feature that highlights recent scholarship in administrative law and related fields. You can find all posts in the series here.