There are weeks in which the D.C. Circuit announces decisions that justify its reputation as an appellate court that tackles some of the thorniest and most consequential legal matters. And then there are weeks like last week.

The D.C. Circuit handed down three opinions.

Maryland Office of People’s Counsel v. FERC, No. 24-1353 involved the 2024/2025 capacity auction of PJM, a Regional Transmission Organization that services thirteen Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states and the District of Columbia. PJM incorrectly anticipated the need for capacity, resulting in a mismatch that if left unaddressed would likely lead to more than $100 million in excess capacity charges. To avoid that outcome, PJM requested relief from FERC under two related but distinct provisions of the Federal Power Act both of which ensure that utilities charge just and reasonable rates but do so in different ways. Section 205 requires regulated entities to file their rates with FERC while section 206 allows FERC to modify existing rates that it deems unjust or unreasonable. FERC approved PJM’s request under section 205 and allowed PJM to run its auction again but denied its section 206 request as moot.

That decision was challenged in the Third Circuit, which held that the decision violated the filed-rate doctrine, which prohibits, among other things, retroactive rate changes. After the Third Circuit’s decision, PJM re-ran its auction using the reliability assumptions that it had made previously. PJM customers then petitioned FERC under section 206 to declare that the results of the new auction were unjust and unreasonable and replace them with an efficient market outcome. FERC denied that request, reasoning that it could not provide relief that would be inconsistent with the Third Circuit’s decision, which it characterized as holding that any modification of the auction-set capacity price would be retroactive in violation of the filed-rate doctrine.

In an opinion written by Judge Henderson and joined by Judges Pillard and Garcia, the D.C. Circuit vacated FERC’s decision, explaining that the Third Circuit considered only whether FERC acted lawfully when it used its section 205 authority to modify the auction process, not whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the resulting auction price. The court explained that the filed-rate doctrine is a default rule and does not categorically bar all backward-looking rate modifications.

In Mehneh v. Rubio, No. 25-1005, the D.C. Circuit dismissed two appeals regarding immigrant visa processing as moot. U. S. citizen Shahnaz Haeri Mehneh petitioned the State Department for an immigrant visa on behalf of her husband and Saeid Motevali-petitioned for an immigrant visa on behalf of his father. The State Department interviewed the applicants and placed their applications in administrative processing. They waited for a decision for over a year and eventually sued for unreasonable delay. The district court dismissed both cases for failure to state a claim for relief. Both noticed appeals. During the pendency of their appeals, the State Department finally processed the applications, awarding a visa to Mehneh’s husband but denying a vista to Motevali’s father.

In an opinion written by Senior Judge Ginsburg and joined by Judge Child and Senior Judge Edwards, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the completed applications mooted the appeals. The court recognized two exceptions to mootness: (1) the voluntary cessation doctrine and (2) the doctrine of “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Mehneh invoked the voluntary cessation doctrine, but the court determined that there was no record evidence that indicated that her husband would likely face such delay again. Indeed, her husband has already entered the country and is applying for a green card. Motevali invoked both mootness exceptions. But his father’s visa was denied for “terrorist activities,” so a consular officer in the future must deny him a visa. There is no reason to expect the State Department to spend significant time processing a future application by Motevali’s father. Both Mehneh and Motevali claimed the State Department purposely mooted their cases to avoid judicial review, but they pointed to no supportive evidence in the record. Finally, the Court declined to create a new mootness exception for unreasonable delay.

In CenturyTel of Montana Inc. v. NLRB, No. 24-1346 (consolidated with No. 24-1352), the D.C. Circuit denied CenturyTel’s petition for review of the decision of the National Labor Relation Board and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order. In so doing, the court affirmed the NLRB’s ruling that CenturyTel violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1).

CenturyTel, and the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, Local Union 768 have had a collective bargaining agreement for many years. Although there were a number of points of contention between the company and the union, the chief controversy involved a request for information the union put to the company to explore whether the company was using non-union technicians to perform work in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Receiving only sparse answers, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, alleging that CenturyTel refused to bargain in good faith. The ALJ sided with the union, and the Board affirmed, with one member dissenting.

In a unanimous opinion by Senior Judge Rogers and joined by Judges Pan and Garcia, the D.C. Circuit focused on whether the union provided the company with sufficient evidence to establish that its request for information was relevant. Although a “bare assertion” is insufficient, the threshold for relevance is a low bar, and the court found that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s conclusion that the union had a reasonable belief that its information request was relevant. And NLRB precedent allows the NLRB to rely on new evidence of the union’s reasonable belief at the ULP hearing.