In Centro de Trabajadores Unidos, et al. v. Scott Bessent, in his capacity as Secretary of the Treasury, et al., No. 25-5181, ICE asked the IRS for addresses to assist in nontax criminal investigations. Plaintiffs sought to block the IRS from providing the addresses but lost in the district court. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court in an opinion authored by Senior Judge Edwards and joined by Chief Judge Srinivasan and Judge Millett. The court held that 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) clearly authorizes the IRS to disclose a taxpayer’s address upon a valid request. Section 6103(i)(2) allows disclosure of “return information other than taxpayer return information” and provides that a “taxpayer’s identity,” defined to include the taxpayer’s address, “shall not be treated as taxpayer return information.” The court rejected the argument that disclosure requires a court order, explaining that Congress expressly included such a requirement elsewhere in the statute but not in § 6103(i)(2).

Further, the court concluded that the MOU between the IRS and the Department of Homeland Security setting forth the procedure and requirements for ICE’s submission of valid requests for addresses is a non-binding policy statement and not final agency action under the APA because the MOU merely clarifies existing statutory duties. The court did not reach the appellants’ argument that the IRS arbitrarily changed its policy because further explanation of the policy change would be a useless formality since the court is required to apply the best reading of the statute under Loper Bright.

Federal law requires private airlines to conduct random drug testing of their pilots and to report any pilot’s refusal to test to the Federal Aviation Administration, triggering significant legal consequences for the pilot. Paul v. Federal Aviation Administration, No. 24-1348 concerns whether the FAA, upon receiving such report, must independently review an airline’s determination that one of its pilots refused to test. In an opinion written by Judge Garcia and joined by Judge Childs and Senior Judge Randolph. The court rejected the FAA’s position that it is not required or even authorized to review an employers’ test-refusal determination. The FAA’s policy raises serious constitutional concerns under the private nondelegation doctrine by granting the employer authority to decide who can fly under federal law without any government review.

Senior Judge Randolph wrote a concurring opinion to explain that in his view the FAA’s decision to accept the employer’s test-refusal determination was appealable to the National Transportation Safety Board, which would provide sufficient governmental oversight to address private nondelegation concerns.

In other news this week, the D. C. Circuit sat en banc for oral argument on Thursday, in National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) v. Vought, No. 25-5091, a case about the executive branch’s power to downsize the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. In early 2025, the Trump administration began funding freezes and reductions in force at the CFPB. The plaintiffs challenged that decision in the district court, arguing that the President does not have authority to abolish an agency that Congress has established by law. In March 2025, the district court paused the reduction in force. A panel of the D.C. Circuit consisting of Judges Katsas and Rao with Judge Pillard dissenting vacated the injunction, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction because reduction in force claims must go through the Civil Service Reform Act’s specialized-review scheme and the decision to downsize the agency was not final agency action reviewable under the APA. In addition to the jurisdictional issues addressed in the panel’s opinion, much of Thursday’s oral argument focused on whether a court could force the CFPB not to lay off its workers, and if so, what the proper scope of such an injunction would be.