Back in the day, cases involving detainees at Guantanamo Bay were argued in the D.C. Circuit regularly and frequently. Lately, not so much, but this week in al-Baluchi v. Hegseth, No. 23-5251 the D.C. Circuit was back at it again, dismissing the appeal of a detainee from a decision of the district court that denied his motion to compel the government to convene a commission to determine whether he is eligible for repatriation because of alleged injuries he suffered at the hands of the CIA before he was sent to Guantanamo. In an opinion written by Judge Garcia and joined by Judges Pillard and Wilkins, the court held that it did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s nonfinal order and that neither of the exceptions to the final-order rule urged by the detainee applied inasmuch as he could not show serious or irreparable harm because the commission he sought to convene could not repatriate him prior to the completion of his prosecution.

In another opinion written by Judge Garcia, this time joined by Judge Walker and Senior Judge Randolph, the D.C. Circuit upheld in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court in  Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP, No. 23-7142. Joyner asserted claims of racial discrimination and hostile work environment under federal law (42 U.S.C. §1981 and Title VII) and wrongful discharge under D.C. law against a legal staffing agency and the law firm of Morrison & Foerster. The district court dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The D.C. Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the federal claims, but that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over the D.C. law claims.

Although the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s claims of race discrimination, it concluded that the district court applied the wrong standard by requiring him to show that his employment situation was “nearly identical” to those of the comparators. That is the standard on summary judgment, but to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only plead facts sufficient to allow a plausible inference that the challenged action was taken because of his race. But that Joyner failed to do. He did not provide any facts showing that the comparators were similarly situated to him, give any description of the work opportunities they were given that he was denied, or allege that the same supervisors were responsible for favoring the comparators over him. 

The court also concluded that Joyner’s hostile work environment claim against Morrison failed because he did not allege that his supervisors were aware of the incidents at all. And while he did allege that he brought some incidents to Morrison’s attention, he also alleged that Morrison quickly responded to those concerns.

Finally, with respect to the wrongful-discharge claim under D.C. law, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction because the claim did not share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the federal discrimination claims. The only facts in common with the federal claims were background facts about Joyner’s employment, and “such a minimal connection between claims is insufficient to support supplemental jurisdiction.”

The Clean Air Act’s (CAA) Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) Program tasks Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with requiring the petroleum industry to use increasing volumes of renewable fuel from year to year. Among other things, the CAA sets out a number of factors that EPA must consider in setting its renewable-fuel standards. As part of that process, EPA must consult with other agencies, including the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the potential impact of agency action on endangered species or critical habitats. In 2023, EPA issued a final rule (referred to as the “Set Rule”) establishing the RFS Program standards for the years 2023-2025. In Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 23-1177, the D.C. Circuit remanded the Set Rule to the EPA and FWS without vacatur in a per curiam opinion by Judges Pillard, Katsas, and Childs.

The court found one error in the EPA’s analysis and one in FWS’s. The first  involved EPA’s analysis of the renewable fuels’ impact on climate change. For some renewable fuels, EPA relied on its own recent literature review. But for other renewable fuels, EPA disregarded that literature without explanation in favor of a 15-year-old study. The court held this unexplained departure was arbitrary and capricious. The second error came FWS’s conclusion that the Set Rule would have “no effect” endangered species or critical habits. The court held that the FWS failed to adequately explain its conclusion.

In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Katsas agreed with the flaws identified by the per curiam opinion, but he would have also held that EPA erred under the CAA by failing to balance the statutorily mandated factors and would have vacated the Set Rule.

In 2022, the D.C. Council passed the Local Resident Voting Rights Amendment Act (“LRVRAA), a law permitting non-citizens to vote in municipal elections. In Hall v. D.C. Board of Elections, No. 24-7050, voters who are D.C. residents and U.S. citizens challenged the law as a violation of the Constitution by impermissibly diluting their votes and discriminating against U.S. citizens. The district court held the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not identified any disadvantage as individual voters, and thus, raised only a “generalized grievance.” In an opinion written by Senior Judge Randolph and joined by Judges Pillard and Childs, the D.C. Circuit reversed. The court explained that vote dilution can be a particularized injury for purposes of standing where the voter has suffered an individualized loss of electoral influence tied to a specific election and geographic area. The plaintiffs in this case met that standard.