Notice & Comment

New Chicago-Kent Law Review Symposium Issue: The Trump Administration and Administrative Law

Here are the details and links to this terrific symposium, from the Chicago-Kent Law Review website:

Vol. 94, Issue 2

The Trump Administration and Administrative Law

Peter L. Strauss
Columbia Law School

Table of Contents
Live Symposium


Peter L. Strauss, Columbia Law School
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 229 (2019)

Prosecutors at the Periphery
Peter M. Shane, Moritz College of Law
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 241 (2019)
Abstract: Contrary to so-called unitary executive theory, Article II does not guarantee presidents the power to control federal criminal prosecution, a supervisory role Congress has place by statute with the Attorney General. Nor is Congress without authority to protect federal prosecutors from policy-based dismissals. Continue—>

Executive Rulemaking and Democratic Legitimacy: “Reform” in the United States and the United Kingdom’s Route to Brexit
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Yale Law School
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 267 (2019)
Abstract: Established public law principles are under strain from the prospect of Brexit in the United Kingdom and the Trump Administration in the United States. In the United Kingdom the Parliament is playing an increasingly important role in overseeing the Government, and the judiciary is beginning to support democratic accountability in executive policymaking. Continue—>

Information Mischief under the Trump Administration
Nathan Cortez, SMU Dedman School of Law
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 315 (2019)
Abstract: The Trump administration has used government information in more cynical ways than its predecessors. For example, it has removed certain information from the public domain, scrubbed certain terminology from government web sites, censored scientists, manipulated public data, and used “transparency” initiatives as a pretext for anti-regulatory policies, particularly environmental policy. Continue—>

Civil Servant Disobedience
Jennifer Nou, University of Chicago Law School
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 349 (2019)
Abstract: Bureaucratic resistance is a historically unexceptional feature of the administrative state. What is striking is the extent to which it has become publicly defiant under the Trump Administration. Civil servants are openly defying executive directives in their official capacity, despite strong norms to the contrary. Continue—>

Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times
Daniel A. Farber, UC Berkeley School of Law
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 383 (2019)
Abstract: This article investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis during an antiregulatory period. The period since 2016 has been several new developments, including the first vigorous use by Congress of its power to overturn recently issued regulations and the creation of novel deregulatory mechanisms layered on top of cost-benefit analysis. Continue—>

Deregulatory Splintering
William W. Buzbee, Georgetown University Law Center
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 439 (2019)
Abstract: When new administrations arrive and consider agency policy changes, they often must choose what actions to take in court or through regulatory process. They may seek to stay an existing regulation, rescind, or possibly replace it. This article assesses strategic uses of, and responses to, agencies that pursue deregulatory rollbacks through a splintered series of steps. Continue—>

The Regulatory Accountability Act and the Future of APA Revision
Ronald M. Levin, Washington University School of Law
94 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 487 (2019)
Abstract: This article seeks to take stock of the Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA), a set of proposals to amend the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). House and Senate versions of the proposed Act have been pending in Congress since 2011, although the impending advent of Democratic control of the House may halt further progress on the bills in their present form. Continue—>

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