Public enforcement actions frequently result in the distribution of money to people affected by violations of market protection laws. This “public compensation” returns billions of dollars to consumers, investors, and others each year. The law of public compensation appears confusing at first impression because of inconsistent use of nomenclature and conceptual confusion. However, courts have […]

This Article addresses an important question in modern antitrust: when large investment funds have holdings across an industry, is competition depressed? The question of the impact of common ownership on competition has gained much attention as the role of institutional shareholding has grown, with the funds of the three largest management companies holding in aggregate […]

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs)—touted as a better alternative to an IPO for taking a company public—have become the next big thing in the securities markets. This Article analyzes the structure of SPACs and the costs embedded in that structure. We find that costs embedded in the SPAC structure are subtle, opaque, higher than has […]

As the Supreme Court reconsiders whether Congress can so freely provide for criminal enforcement of agency rules, this Article assesses the critique of administrative crimes though a federal criminal law lens. It explores the extent to which this critique carries over to other instances of mostly well-accepted, delegated federal criminal lawmaking—to courts, states, foreign governments, […]

The century-long separation of banking and commerce enshrined in U.S. law has weakened in recent decades. The academic literature has thus far focused mainly on conceptual benefits and costs of the trend, arguing that the integration of banking and commerce might lead to efficiency gains through diversification in a greater number of distinct business lines, […]

This Note examines the relationship between presidential signing statements and administrative decision-making over the Obama and Trump presidencies and from a variety of institutional angles, updating previous studies rooted in a narrow set of observations from the mid-2000s. It identifies occasions where presidents, agencies, and other Executive Branch actors have referenced statements in the course […]

Bankruptcy has a tort problem. Chapter 11 predictably subordinates the claims of tort and other involuntary creditors to those of financial lenders, a fact which encourages firms to rely excessively on secured debt and discount the interests of those they might incidentally harm. For this reason, many scholars have advocated changing repayment priorities to move […]

A huge literature contemplates the theoretical relationship between judicial deference and agency rulemaking. But relatively little empirical work has studied the actual effect of deference on how agencies draft regulations. As a result, some of the most important questions surrounding deference—whether it encourages agencies to focus on policy analysis instead of legal analysis, its relationship […]

Why are green shoe options used in initial public offerings (IPOs)? And why do underwriters usually short sell an issuer’s stock in connection with its IPO? Are underwriters permitted to profit from these trading positions? Scholars have long argued that underwriters use green shoe options together with short sales to facilitate price stabilizing activities, and […]

Recent conservation and administrative law scholarship emphasizes the need for potential legal adversaries to work together. Stakeholders and regulators can pool their political capital, money, property, expertise, and legal leverage to achieve more than could be accomplished through mere mechanical implementation of statutory commands. Most commentators associate collaboration with programs promoting fuzzy objectives to engage […]

In the largest system of federal adjudication—Social Security disability adjudication—outcomes depend more on the randomly assigned judge than on the strength of the case. Does the administrative appeals process use resources effectively to reduce that arbitrariness and limit the discretion of administrative law judges? If not, how and why does it fail? These are empirical […]

The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting power. Whether a director is elected or a merger is approved depends on how shareholders vote. Yet, in private corporations shareholders routinely alter their rights by contract. This phenomenon of shareholder agreements—contracts among the owners of a firm— has received […]