Notice & Comment

Ad Law Reading Room: “Closing Adjudicative Discretion,” by Joshua Feinzig

Today’s Ad Law Reading Room entry is “Closing Adjudicative Discretion,” by Joshua Feinzig, which is forthcoming in the Cornell Law Review. Here is the abstract:

Can an agency turn a delegated “may” into a “must”? Congress frequently grants agencies discretion to provide immigration relief, issue benefits or licenses, or waive statutory requirements. Yet agencies sometimes supplant these judgments with categorical rules. Whether they may do so marks a longstanding but undertheorized instability in the meaning of discretionary authority and its allocation within agencies. This instability has acquired renewed urgency as political leaders seek to suppress adjudicator discretion, particularly in immigration, and as machine-driven governance raises parallel concerns about the “fettering” of discretion through uncritical reliance on algorithmic recommendations.

The dominant modern view treats the conversion of “may” into “must” as an ordinary incident of agency hierarchy. Where Congress authorizes rather than mandates an outcome, so the thinking goes, agency leaders may decide how much discretion, if any, to leave to subordinates. But a competing tradition understands discretion not merely as opening a space of permissible outcomes, but as entailing a mode of decisionmaking marked by flexible and contextual judgment. On this alternative view, an agency entrusted with discretion must preserve room for its exercise, which may require leaving some decisional leeway to the adjudicator at the point of decision.

Drawing on judicial doctrine, internal agency materials, and contemporaneous legal thought, I reconstruct these rival conceptions and trace a historical transformation in the legal meaning of discretionary authority. The discretion-preserving conception emerged from the traditions of equity jurisdiction and remained a central feature of administrative legality well into the mid-twentieth century. Only as administrative law confronted the problems of excessive and unstructured frontline discretion over the 1960s and 1970s did it gradually lose sight of its complementary role in preserving case-level discretion against the pressures of centralization and routinization.

There is reason now, however, to revisit this transformation and ultimately reinvigorate the discretion-preserving tradition. The intellectual and doctrinal foundations of the modern understanding have eroded in important respects. Meanwhile, executive consolidation has shifted the balance of institutional concerns, such that the principal threat to administrative justice today lies not in excessive frontline discretion but in its top-down suppression. And the challenges posed by algorithmic fettering have exposed a gap in administrative legality that a contemporary revitalization of this tradition can help fill.

One of administrative law’s longstanding obsessions has been the “problem” of agency discretion. The benefits of clear rules, articulated in advance of individualized review, are well known and reflected in a broad range of legal doctrines. Case-by-case discretion is, of course, alive and well. But as a matter of law-on-the-books it is more likely to be grudgingly acknowledged than it is to be thought worthy of protection from administrators seeking to “rulify” discretionary grants of authority.

“Closing Adjudicative Discretion” refreshingly questions contemporary administrative law’s across-the-board preference for supplanting discretion with more rule-like structures and shows how we got to where we are today. At the paper’s heart is a deceptively simple thought: At least in some contexts, the law may require agency officials to exercise flexible, context-sensitive judgment as a mode of decisionmaking. The care with which Feinzig unpacks it makes for a very enjoyable read.

The Ad Law Reading Room is a recurring feature that highlights recent scholarship in administrative law and related fields. You can find all posts in the series here.