As part of my prep for this year’s ABA Administrative Law Conference, I put together a list of the regulatory policy documents that have been issued since the start of President Trump’s second term.

Looking over these documents, a few themes emerge. First, the assertion of executive power. You can see this in assertions that the President and Attorney General’s views about the law bind the views of the executive branch (EO 14215), and extension of OIRA review to independent regulatory agencies (EO 14215) and tax regulations (EO 14192). Second, a continued interest in deregulatory actions, where Trump expands his first term signature policy of the “regulatory 2-for-1” into a 10-for-1 initiative. In the first term there was more smoke than fire surrounding this initiative but we will see how it plays out in the second term. The “DOGE” deregulatory efforts–including an attempt to use LLMs and generative AI to target and remove regulations–are new this term, but the results are far from clear. Third, throughout many of the items listed below, an interest in relaxing or removing procedural requirements long viewed as part and parcel of how the government works under the APA.

A lot of this material is in different places, so in this post I share a long list of links, bundled loosely by topic and in roughly chronological order. I hope you find them useful. If you see something I missed, or find a dead link, let me know and I’ll update the post.

• Day 1 Actions (Jan. 20, 2025)
  • Regulatory Freeze PM halting publication, directing review of actions in progress
    • OMB M-25-10 implementing the freeze
  • EO 14148 – Revoking Biden’s revocation of EO 13771 (two-for-one and regulatory budget), EO 13777 (reg reform task force), EO 13891 (guidance websites), EO 13892 (enforcement), EO 13893 (admin PAYGO)
  • EO 14158 – Establishing the “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE)
• EO 14192 (Jan. 31, 2025) (ten-for-one, regulatory budget, OIRA review of tax regulations)
  • OMB M-25-15 (Feb. 12, 2025) revoking Circular A-4 (2023) and reinstating Circular A-4 (2003)
  • OMB M-25-20 (Mar. 26, 2025) implementing guidance for ten-for-one & regulatory budget
• EO 14215 (Feb. 18, 2025) (OIRA review of independent regulatory agencies, assertion that the President and AG’s views of the law control all legal interpretations of the executive branch)
  • OMB M-25-24 (Apr. 17, 2025) implementing OIRA review of independent regulatory agencies
• EO 14219 (Feb. 19, 2025) tasking agencies to work with DOGE and OMB to review all regulations to identify
  • “unconstitutional regulations and regulations that raise serious constitutional difficulties;”
  • “regulations that are based on unlawful delegations of legislative power;”
  • “regulations that are based on anything other than the best reading of the statute;”
  • “regulations that implicate matters of social, political, or economic significance that are not authorized by clear statutory authority;”
  • “regulations that impose significant costs upon private parties that are not outweighed by public benefits;”
  • “regulations that harm the national interest by significantly and unjustifiably impeding technological innovation, infrastructure development, disaster response, inflation reduction, research and development, economic development, energy production, land use, and foreign policy objectives;” and
  • “regulations that impose undue burdens on small business and impede private enterprise and entrepreneurship.”
• HHS revokes the Richardson waiver (Mar. 3, 2025); clearing the way for HHS to skip notice & comment rulemaking on grant and other matters
• EO 14267 (Apr. 9, 2025) to review and rescind regulations deemed to be anti-competitive (e.g., creating unnecessary barriers to entry)
• Presidential Memorandum (Apr. 9, 2025) directing agencies to review the “lawfulness” of their regulations in light of the holdings of 10 Supreme Court cases including Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo; West Virginia v. EPA; and SEC v. Jarkesy, and directing agencies to use the “good cause” exemption to APA notice & comment rulemaking to rescind “facially unlawful” rules or those that need to be repealed because of a Supreme Court decision.
  • OMB M-25-28 (May 7, 2025) describing the factors agencies should consider in evaluating rules under the 10 cases listed in the April 9, 2025 PM
• EO 14294 (May 9, 2025) directing agencies to prepare a report on criminal regulatory offences, to be made public within 1 year, and adding additional process for new regulations that contain such offences
• EO 14295 (May 9, 2025) pushing the Office of Federal Register to publish regulations more quickly and cheaply
• 13 Direct Final Rules from Dept of Energy (May 16, 2025) arguing a novel standard for direct final rules and relying upon Little Sisters of the Poor to justify departure from long-established DFR procedure
• DOGE Slide Deck (July 1, 2025) (via Washington Post) pitching an initiative to use the “DOGE AI Solution” to target 50% of existing regulations and then rescind them using reviewed generative AI outputs
• OMB M-25-36 (Oct. 21, 2025)
  • Shortening OIRA review timelines for deregulatory actions;
  • Establishing a presumption that public consultation requirements should not apply for deregulatory actions;
  • Echoing the April 9, 2025 PM call to skip APA notice & comment rulemaking using “good cause;”
  • Highlighting APA § 553(d)(1) allowing immediate effective dates for actions that grant exemptions or relieve restrictions;
  • Directing agencies to consider “unlawful” any regulations that are not based on the statute’s “single, best meaning” under Loper Bright or which fails the major questions doctrine under West Virginia v. EPA; the agency should be “convinced” of unlawfulness and expect a “reasonably good change of success on the merits;”
  • Asserting that Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania contains the “Supreme Court’s full endorsement to use the interim final rule process to put out rules having legal effectiveness first and then proceed to address comments later;”
  • Noting that cost-benefit analysis in “facially illegal deregulatory situations” might not be “worth the gain of this additional defense against litigation” and seemingly deferring to the agency about the choice of whether to conduct CBA; and
  • Setting out 4 distinct types of benefits of deregulation