I’ve written before about the D. C. Circuit practice that a judge who has failed to circulate to the panel more than two of his assigned opinions from the term by August 15 may not hear cases in the new term that begins in September until they have been circulated. For that reason, typically there is a rush of opinions released right before August 15 when the rest of D. C. is at the beach. Last week’s released opinions include cases argued as far back as November and December, 2025, and January and February of this year.

Starting with the opinion that took the longest to run the gauntlet to publication and moving forward to the most recent:

Cuban medical professionals alleged that the Pan American Health Organization (“PAHO”) facilitated human trafficking in a program ostensibly created to expand access to medical care in Brazil.  PAHO moved to dismiss their claim arguing immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act. 22 U.S.C. 288a(b).  The district court denied the motion, and the D. C. Circuit affirmed.  Rodriguez v. Pan American Health Organization, No. 24-7135 (D. C. Cir. 2022).  On remand, PAHO offered evidence supporting its immunity defense in a motion to dismiss, and the district court granted the medical professionals’ request for discovery to challenge that evidence.  PAHO appealed the discovery order.

Writing for a unanimous panel that included Judges Millett and Pan, Judge Garcia dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  The court distinguished between an interlocutory appeal of a decision on a motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity for which there is appellate jurisdiction, and an interlocutory appeal of an order granting jurisdictional discovery that is limited to factual disputes about an immunity defense for which there is not.

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Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (“SPP”) operates the electric transmission grid covering much of the central United States. SPP proposed to shift the costs of four electric-transmission facilities, which had been borne primarily by the facilities’ local zone, across the broader SPP region. FERC approved that proposal. In City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 24-1270, utilities, transmission owners, and a state regulator representing affected ratepayers whose costs would increase as a result petitioned for review on grounds that FERC’s approval was inadequately reasoned and unsupported by substantial evidence. In an opinion written by Judge Garcia and joined by Chief Judge Srinivasan and Judge Henderson, the D. C. Circuit upheld FERC’s decision because it was based on substantial evidence that the four facilities are primarily serving and benefiting customers outside of the facilities’ local zone, and that re-allocating costs would make them commensurate with the benefit provided to customers outside the local zone.

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The Endangered Species Act (”ESA”) provides protections to “endangered” species facing the possibility of extinction and, to a lesser degree, “threatened” species that are likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future.  Section 1533(e) of the ESA allows the Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) to treat an animal species as endangered or threatened if it looks like another species that is, thus removing the excuse that an offender thought he was harming or killing an unprotected animal.  The Service has long applied this provision only to species that are not already listed as endangered or threatened. 

In Friends of Animals v. Martha Jenkins, No. 24-5278, Judge Wilkins, joined by Judges Henderson and Pillard, affirmed the Service’s longstanding practice.  In doing so, it reversed a district court decision that concluded that a subspecies of the Scarlet Macaw qualified for the robust protections accorded endangered species, even though it was listed only as threatened.  The Court found that statutory text, contemporaneous regulation, and statutory purpose all supported the Service’s position that it may not upgrade an animal’s status under Section 1533(e) if it is already listed as threatened.

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In Fishman v. District of Columbia, No. 25-7050, a bystander’s 9-1-1 report of a possible kidnapping or child abuse led Metropolitan Police Department officers to detain Jared Fishman outside his D. C. home for about 25 minutes during their investigation. The child in question was his daughter.  The officers released him after confirming no crime had occurred. Fishman subsequently sued the District of Columbia and the police officers, alleging that he was detained after reasonable suspicion had dissipated, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Fishman also claimed that he was arrested without probable cause and raised a D. C. common-law false-imprisonment claim.  The district court granted Fishman partial summary judgment, denying the officers qualified immunity, ruling that clearly established law required the officers to release Fishman before they did.

Chief Judge Srinivasan, writing for a unanimous panel that included Judge Garcia and Senior Judge Edwards reversed, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.  The court also held that even assuming the stop was analyzed solely under a child-abuse theory (with kidnapping abandoned on appeal), no clearly established law showed that reasonable suspicion never existed or had dissipated before the stop ended, entitling the officers to qualified immunity on the prolonged-detention claim.  It reached this conclusion because (1) the officers had arguable reasonable suspicion of child-abuse related offenses based on the dispatch and witness account, (2) Fishman’s initial noncooperation, (3) the officers’ need to speak with the child to confirm safety, and (4) no controlling authority or robust consensus clearly forbade detaining Fishman under these circumstances.

As to the unlawful-arrest theory, Fishman forfeited any argument that the Terry stop became an arrest by not addressing the issue in his response.  Finally, the D. C. Circuit declined pendent appellate jurisdiction over the D. C.  false-imprisonment claim.

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Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Secretary of Defense to publish a list of all “Chinese military companies” operating in the United States. “Chinese military companies” are defined as companies that knowingly receive assistance from the Chinese government and contribute to the Chinese defense industrial base.

In SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 25-5367, DJI, a drone manufacturing company, challenged its listing as a “Chinese military company” arguing that the listing violated its due process rights, lacked evidentiary support, and was inadequately explained. The district court rejected those claims and granted summary judgment against DJI.

In an opinion written by Judge Garcia and joined by Chief Judge Srinivasan and Judge Wilkins, the D. C. Circuit affirmed the district court on the due process claim but reversed on the arbitrary and capricious claim. On due process, the court held that DJI failed to show that the listing imposed a sigma so severe that it precludes DJI from pursuing its business because even after the listing DJI remained a market leader.  However, the panel reversed the district court’s decision on the arbitrary and capricious claim because the district court upheld the Department’s determination on grounds different from those on which the agency based its decision in violation of the Chenery doctrine. The district court upheld the Department’s finding that DJI contributes to the Chinese defense industrial base based only on the unclassified portions of the record, but the Department’s decision was based only on the portion of the record that was classified.

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Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), an “arriving alien” is subject to expedited removal proceedings.  DHS regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 states that a paroled alien—already permitted to enter the United States temporarily—is an “arriving alien.”  The Trump Administration has sought to subject parolees to expedited removal proceedings.  First, a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“Memorandum”) directed immigration officers to consider whether to apply expedited removal to active parolees.  Second, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement email (“Email”) indicates officers may process expedited removals for “any arriving alien,” including “paroled arriving aliens.”  The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (the “Coalition”) challenged the Memorandum and the Email, but not 8 C.F.R. § 1.2.  The district court granted a stay of the two measures as to any parolees.  The government appealed the stay.

In Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin, No. 25-5289, a panel consisting of Chief Judge Srinivasan and Judges Rao and Walker issued a per curiam opinion vacating the stay.  The panel first confirmed its appellate jurisdiction.  The district court’s stay has the “practical effect” of an injunction, thus bringing the stay within the D. C. Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 705.  Indeed, the stay imposes irreparable injury on the Government.  The panel also confirmed the Government’s standing to appeal.  For the Government to appeal, it must show harm from the order entered—and the district court’s order could plausibly be read to block the Government from relying on 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. 

Next, the court determined the Coalition lacked standing to seek the stay in district court.  The Coalition asserted that the Memorandum and the Email have increased the likelihood of expedited removal, causing them harm by depriving them of ordinary removal proceedings.  But “[e]ven if the number of expedited removals increased because of the Memorandum and Email, that does not mean getting rid of the Memorandum and Email will reverse that trend.”  Plaintiffs did not request a stay of 8 C.F.R. § 1.2, so the Coalition was not seeking a remedy that would redress its asserted injury; the Government would still retain authority to expedite removals under the regulation.  Because the Coalition lacked standing, the court vacated the district court’s stay of the Memorandum and Email.

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Edward Williams pled guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon in violation of 28 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was charged with this offense while on parole after serving 26 months for attempted possession of cocaine, to which he had pled guilty. On collateral review of his conviction under 28 U. S. C. 922(g)(1), Williams moved the district court to vacate his sentence, relying upon Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019). The district court denied his motion.

In United States v. Williams, No. 24-3067, Judge Katsas, joined by Judges Rao and Childs, affirmed the district court concluding that Williams “doubly defaulted” by failing to raise this argument at sentencing or on direct appeal.  To overcome the default on collateral review, Williams had to show either (1) cause for the default and prejudice from the error or (2) actual innocence.  First, Williams failed to show prejudice.  According to the panel, “[o]ne fact alone makes it all but certain that Williams” knew of his felon status: “He received a three-year sentence for the predicate cocaine offense, and he served more than two years in prison for that offense before being released on parole.”  Williams accordingly knew he was convicted of a felony—a crime with the possibility of punishment greater than one year.  Circumstantial evidence, including the plea deal and the Superior Court docket sheet, affirmed his knowledge of his felon status.  Second, Williams failed to show his actual innocence under Section 922(g)(1) for the same reasons.  Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Williams an evidentiary hearing.