Notice & Comment

Induced Government Capacity

We learned this week that, as part of a deal to avoid legal action by the Trump administration, a major law firm provided nearly $12 million in free services to the government. This deal reflects a tactic pioneered by this administration—let’s call it induced government capacity—that may be tempting for other presidencies as well in our era of high ambitions and ballooning deficits.

Begin with the broader legal context. By design, statutes often give the government leverage over regulated parties. In the criminal context, legislators tilt toward severity so as to create a “trial penalty” that induces plea bargains. In effect, they set unreasonable sticker prices for misconduct so as to facilitate negotiation of more reasonable market-price penalties.

Civil penalties in administrative contexts may function similarly; my colleague Dave Owen has shown, for example, that environmental compliance is often more a matter of negotiation than governmental imposition. Similarly, required permits and approvals may enable agencies to impose conditions or extract concessions that achieve regulatory goals.

If employed in a manner faithful to underlying statutory aims, such structures can provide valuable mechanisms for advancing legal compliance, albeit at the cost of circumventing ostensible procedural requirements (a particular problem with criminal plea bargains). They also, however, give rise to a recurrent problem: How far can the government go in imposing conditions in exchange for legal forbearance?

A high-profile version of this problem arose in recent decades in connection with “deferred prosecution agreements.” By threatening corporations with criminal charges (effectively a corporate death sentence), prosecutors realized they could induce them to accept wide-ranging changes and reforms. Sometimes, though, the conditions they imposed bore little connection to the statutes ostensibly being enforced. In the most notorious cases, prosecutors obtained commitments to keep jobs in a particular state or endow a law school professorship.

Another version arose in connection with some controversial administrative waivers. In a phenomenon David Barron and Todd Rakoff dubbed “big waiver,” recent major statues have often imposed detailed and onerous conditions but then allowed executive waivers. Rather than delegating broad authority to impose detailed rules, as was typical of New Deal-era statues, such laws impose the detailed rules themselves while delegating authority to undo them.

This structure results in a problem akin to deferred prosecution agreements: executive officials can exploit their waiver authority to induce acceptance of other, quite different obligations. At any rate, critics charged the Obama administration with having done just that in the education context. By waiving requirements in the No Child Left Behind Act, the administration induced states to accept the administration’s own, materially different Race to the Top program.

In both these contexts, I argued at the time that executive officials were exceeding their lawful authority. In conferring prosecutorial discretion or waiver power, Congress affords tools for achieving compliance with the laws providing those authorities. It does not confer an unbounded, all-purpose power to impose whatever executive conditions counterparties will accept. Reading the laws that way would not only defy the enacting Congresses’ likely expectations; it would also unlawfully create wide-open delegations with no intelligible principle.

Unfortunately, whatever the issues in these earlier examples, such maneuvers have emerged as a recurrent governing tactic in the second Trump administration. Elena Chachko and Jon Gould address this phenomenon of “administration by leverage” in a draft paper, and Ashley Deeks and Kristen Eichensehr have documented its use among other tools in creating a “new command economy” in the national security context.

In a recent article of my own, I argued that agreements like the law firm deals not only abuse the legal authorities at issue but also circumvent Congress’s critical authority over spending, creating the problem of induced government capacity that I started with.

In the law firm context, for example, President Trump had leverage based on his authority to withdraw security clearances or otherwise limit access to the government. In addition, law firms often faced legal exposure due to allegedly unlawful hiring and promotion practices.

The administration could reasonably have employed this leverage to induce greater compliance with the laws affording the leverage: it could, for example, have taken steps to ensure greater information security or stronger compliance with civil rights laws. Instead, it got the firms to provide pro bono services for favored causes and, it turns out, extensive free work for the government.

This maneuver—and there are other examples from the past two years—is an abuse of delegated authority for the reasons described earlier. As a practical matter, instead of employing legal authorities to induce compliance with the laws conferring those powers, the administration is treating them as open-ended delegations of power to impose whatever conditions it wants.

On top of that problem, however, these conditions also effectively circumvent Congress’s power of the purse. As my article discusses, Congress properly holds authority to determine the level of capacity available for various government functions. It can toggle up or down, or eliminate altogether, the resources available for different activities. Yet if executive officials can leverage penal authorities and legal chokepoints to induce “voluntary” outside assistance instead, then executive officials can get expanded capacity without obtaining congressional approval.

The sort of executive action reflected in the law firm deals is thus doubly concerning. It exceeds the proper scope of legal authorities and it undermines Congress’s power of the purse. The tactic may be tempting, however, in part because it enables the pursuit of executive objectives without burdening taxpayers or adding to the national debt. For that reason among others, future presidents may well seek to build on Trump’s examples.

Zachary S. Price is a Professor at the University of California College of Law, San Francisco (formerly UC Hastings).